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Abstract
Alongside other actors such as the European Ombudsman, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) plays what
looks like, at first sight, a key role in improving the transparency of EU legislative procedures. To take two relatively recent
examples, theDe Capitani v. European Parliament (2018) judgmentwas perceived as a victory by those in favor of increased
transparency of EU legislative procedures at the stage of trilogues, as was the ClientEarth v. European Commission (2018)
judgment regarding the pre-initiative stage. Both rulings emphasize the need for “allowing citizens to scrutinize all the infor-
mation which has formed the basis of a legislative act…[as] a precondition for the effective exercise of their democratic
rights” (ClientEarth v. European Commission, 2018, §84; De Capitani v. European Parliament, 2018, §80). Nevertheless,
while the CJEU’s case law may indeed contribute to improving the legislative process’ transparency, its impact on the lat-
ter is inherently limited and even bears the potential of having a perverse effect. This article sheds light on the limits of
the CJEU’s capacity to act in this field and the potential effects of its case law on the EU institutions’ attitudes or inter-
nal organization.
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1. Introduction
Many individuals or NGOs active in the field of trans-
parency are confronted with confirmatory decisions of
EU institutions rejecting their requests for access to doc-
uments. These individuals and NGOs then place a lot
of hope in actions for annulment of those decisions
brought before the Court of Justice of the European
Union (hereafter CJEU), be it in first instance the
General Court or in appeal the Court of Justice (Driessen,
2012, pp. 254–260). Alongside other actors such as the
European Ombudsman, the CJEU serves what looks like,
at first sight, a key role in improving the EU legislative
procedures’ transparency.
Under EU law, transparency relates to the broader
concept of openness. Whereas the Treaties do not pro-
vide us with a definition of what the principle of open-
ness entails, the academic literature offers a wide range
of diverse understandings, often using, similarly to the
CJEU itself, the concepts of openness and transparency
interchangeably (Curtin & Mendes, 2011, p. 103). In our
opinion, openness of decision-making should be under-
stood as entailing two aspects, namely transparency—
defined restrictively as the possibility for any individ-
ual to access information (de Fine Licht & Naurin, 2016,
p. 217; Wyatt, 2018)—and participation—defined as the
actual possibility to participate in the decision-making
process (Alemanno, 2014). These two elements are
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interlinked in the sense that meaningful participation
necessitates fully-fledged transparency. In other words,
the former is dependent on the latter. This is partic-
ularly salient in the context of the EU legislative pro-
cess, in which the purpose of transparency of ongoing
procedures is about public scrutiny—or accountability
to the public—but also allowing, in a timely manner,
the participation of any interested citizen while a leg-
islative act is in the making. It is this understanding of
openness that the CJEU gives when stating that “allow-
ing citizens to scrutinize all the information which has
formed the basis of a legislative act…is a precondition
for the effective exercise of their democratic rights”
(e.g., ClientEarth v. European Commission, 2018, §84;
De Capitani v. European Parliament, 2018, §80). Even
though it offers us such a bold statement, the CJEU’s
ability to satisfy the expectations of pro-transparency
activists is limited for various reasons. Moreover, while
some rulings appear at first glance to foster the trans-
parency of the EU legislative process, they can paradoxi-
cally lead to the contrary.
This article aims to shed light on these limitations
and pitfalls by focusing on the limits of the impact of the
judiciary on the legislative process’ transparency. First,
it gives a short overview of the key provisions of EU
law relevant for the debate on the transparency of the
legislative process. Second, it highlights three inherent
limits—the limits of interpretation, the principles of insti-
tutional balance and institutional autonomy, and time—
of the CJEU’s action on the matter. It does so by draw-
ing on some lessons from the case law, taking the judg-
ments De Capitani v. European Parliament (2018) of the
General Court and ClientEarth v. European Commission
(2018) of the Court of Justice as cases of reference for
this discussion, given they both draw on previous case
law on the transparency of the legislative process (such
as the cases Council v. Access Info Europe, 2013; Herbert
Smith Freehills v. Council, 2016; Sison v. Council, 2007;
Sweden and Others v. API and Commission, 2010; and
Sweden and Turco v. Council, 2008), but also build on
the latter on crucial stages of the legislative procedures.
Third, this article touches upon the issue of the risk of
perverse effect of the CJEU’s case law in this field. It con-
cludes by saying that if the CJEU indeed has the capac-
ity to improve the openness of the legislative process,
this capacity is more limited than we might think and
bears a potential perverse effect. On a final note, it raises
some suggestions on how to rebalance the dynamics in
place between the judiciary and the legislative branch to
increase the capacity of the CJEU to act in this field.
2. Legal Background
According to the Treaties, the functioning of the EU relies
on two complementary models of democracy (Curtin
& Leino-Sandberg, 2016, p. 4). First, it is founded on
the model of representative democracy (Consolidated
version of the Treaty on European Union [TEU], 2016,
Article 10(1–2)), according to which citizens elect repre-
sentatives who in turn should be held accountable to the
citizens for the decisions they take. Second, it is equally
founded on the model of participatory democracy as
the Treaties expressly foresee that “[e]very citizen shall
have the right to participate in the democratic life of the
Union.” Thus, “[i]n order to promote good governance
and ensure the participation of civil society,” EU institu-
tions shall conduct theirwork and take their decisions “as
openly as possible to the citizen” (Consolidated version
of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union
[TFEU], 2016, Article 15(1); TEU, 2016, Article 10(3)).
Concretely, EU “institutions shall, by appropriate means,
give citizens and representative associations the oppor-
tunity to make known and publicly exchange their views
in all areas of Union action” (Marxsen, 2015; Mendes,
2011; TEU, 2016, Article 11(1)). In addition, the Treaties
add that each institution “shall ensure that its proceed-
ings are transparent” (TFEU, 2016, Article 15(3)), and
both the Treaties and the Charter of Fundamental Rights
of the EU recognize the right of any EU citizen, and
any natural or legal person residing or having its reg-
istered office in a Member State, to access EU institu-
tions’ documents, subject to limitations on grounds of
public or private interest as fixed under EU secondary law
(Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union,
2016, Articles 42 and 52; TFEU, 2016, Article 15(3)). It is
through these various provisions that the principle of
openness, as defined in the introduction, arises.
The central piece of secondary legislation on trans-
parency isRegulation (EC)No 1049/2001 of the European
Parliament and of the Council of 30 May 2001 regard-
ing Public Access to European Parliament, Council and
Commission Documents (2001; hereafter Regulation
No 1049/2001). This Regulation fixes the conditions gov-
erning the right of access to documents and its lim-
its. It poses that the “widest possible access to docu-
ments” should be the norm while the denial of access,
on the grounds foreseen under Article 4, be the excep-
tion (Article 1; Recitals 4 and 11). It also emphasizes
that “[o]penness enables citizens to participate more
closely in the decision-making process and guarantees
that the administration enjoys greater legitimacy and is
more effective and more accountable to the citizen in a
democratic system” and “contributes to strengthening
the principles of democracy” (Recital 2). Despite some
attempts to revamp the already 20 year old Regulation,
interinstitutional negotiations have not led to any com-
promise as “Member States are divided in the Council
into those thinking reform ought to mean going forward
towards increased openness, and those wishing to turn
the clock back” (Leino, 2011, p. 1216).
Legislative procedures (TFEU, 2016, Articles 289
and 294) benefit from increased transparency require-
ments. In particular, the Treaties emphasize that “[t]he
European Parliament shall meet in public,” as shall
the Council when considering, deliberating and voting
on a draft legislative act (TFEU, 2016, Article 15(2);
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TEU, 2016, Article 16(8)). Hence the Treaties seem
to establish a close relationship between legislative
procedures and transparency (Council v. Access Info
Europe, Opinion of Advocate General Cruz Villalón, 2013,
§§39–40). However, the Treaties underline that access
to documents relating to legislative procedures also
suffer from limitations fixed in the above-mentioned
Regulation (TFEU, 2016, Article 15(3)). As emphasized
in the Regulation, “[w]ider access should be granted
to documents in cases where the institutions are act-
ing in their legislative capacity” and “[s]uch documents
should be made directly accessible to the greatest
possible extent,” yet “the effectiveness of the institu-
tions’ decision-making process” should be preserved
(Articles 2(4) and 12(2), Recital 6). In any case, according
to a well-known legal principle, exceptions to the right
of access must be interpreted and applied strictly, even
more so, as induced from the considerations above and
a well-established case law, in a legislative context, in
which “the discretion left to the institutions not to dis-
close documents that are part of the normal legislative
process is extremely limited or non-existent” (see e.g.,
Council v. Access Info Europe, 2013, §63; De Capitani v.
European Parliament, 2018, §40).
3. Three Limits to the CJEU’s Contribution
The Treaties give one single yet important mission to the
CJEU, namely to “ensure that in the interpretation and
application of the Treaties the law is observed” (TEU,
2016, Article 19). This role as central judicial actor of the
EU legal order comprises, as in any democratic system,
the duty to provide checks and balances against abuse
of other branches of power, which constitute an impor-
tant “judicial influence in the political process” (Alter,
1998, p. 124). Like any other actor though, “courts have
political limits,” or what Alter (1998, p. 138) describes as
“some area of ‘acceptable latitude,’ beyond which they
cannot stray.” This ‘acceptable latitude’ of action in the
field of transparency appears limited by three factors:
the limits of interpretation, the principles of institutional
balance and of institutional autonomy, and the impor-
tance of time in this area.
3.1. The Limits of Interpretation
The framing of the above-mentioned role of the CJEU
means that its margin of maneuver is inevitably limited
by the provisions of EU law at stake and, consequently,
the limits to their interpretation. No lawyer would find
anything surprising here. Even if, through interpretation,
the boundaries of the understanding of provisions may
be dynamic, evolve over time, sometimes dramatically,
they remain boundaries. It must be borne in mind that
the CJEU, built on themodel of the French Conseil d’État,
follows a civil law tradition despite featuring someminor
common law procedural characteristics. In interpreting
EU law, no matter which method of interpretation it
uses (literal/grammatical, historical, systematical, purpo-
sive or ‘effet utile’; Grimmel, 2012, p. 532), the Court
must strike a delicate balance between “[making] sense
of the political compromises embodied in the relevant
legislation” and paying what Arnull (2009, p. 1238) calls
“[j]udicial respect” for the “essential elements of those
compromises.” It is crucial for the CJEU to keep, at least,
“the appearance of judicial neutrality, which is the basis
for parties accepting the legitimacy of [its] decisions”
(Alter, 1998, p. 135). It involves paying due respect to
the nature and contexts of the case at stake. Anymisstep
always bears the risk of giving more ground to authors
describing the CJEU as “an uncontrolled authority gener-
ating law” (Alter, 1998, p. 129).
Beyond the inherent limits of interpretation, the
CJEU’s involvement in the transparency debate is also
limited in the sense that it can only interpret what it is
given a chance to interpret. To give one example, so as
not to appear as ruling ultra petita, the General Court
explicitly underlined in the De Capitani case that its rul-
ing did not in any way conclude that “direct access to
ongoing trilogue work within the meaning of Article 12
of Regulation No 1049/2001” should be ensured, as
the case concerned solely the access to the fourth col-
umn of documents “on specific request,” lodged pur-
suant to the same Regulation (see below—De Capitani
v. European Parliament, 2018, §86). The General Court
was not offered the possibility to rule beyond this spe-
cific context. Themere fact that the General Court under-
lines what it does not say shows its acknowledgment
of its limits, and that it feels the necessity to empha-
size it. In other words, the CJEU needs to receive cases
to judge, and more specifically here, cases that mobi-
lize provisions whose interpretation could constitute an
opportunity for improving the transparency of the leg-
islative process. Yet the possibilities for cases to reach
the CJEU are very limited due to procedural constraints.
Cases on transparency brought by individuals or NGOs
are inevitably not numerous as any individual willing to
launch an action for annulment of a decision refusing the
access to documents must demonstrate an interest in
bringing proceedings, comply with the other restrictive
conditions set in Article 263 TFEU (2016), act within a lim-
ited period and have the legal and financial resources to
do so.
As a result, if some sort of judicial activism can take
place in this field, its ambition is inherently limited.
When the CJEU states that “allowing citizens to scru-
tinize all the information which has formed the basis
of a legislative act…is a precondition for the effective
exercise of their democratic rights” (e.g., ClientEarth
v. European Commission, 2018, §84; De Capitani v.
European Parliament, 2018, §80), it can comfortably
rely on the primary law and secondary law men-
tioned above. Yet if such a general consideration by
the CJEU is welcome, it does not per se lead to
any subjective right. The CJEU gets more adventurous
when, in the ClientEarth case, it asserts that “allowing
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divergences between various points of view to be openly
debated…also contributes to increasing…citizens’ con-
fidence in those institutions” (ClientEarth v. European
Commission, 2018, §75) and that:
[B]y increasing the legitimacy of the Commission’s
decision-making process, transparency ensures the
credibility of that institution’s action in the minds
of citizens and concerned organizations and thus
specifically contributes to ensuring that that institu-
tion acts in a fully independent manner and exclu-
sively in the general interest. (ClientEarth v. European
Commission, 2018, §104)
The ClientEarth judgment was rendered on appeal of a
judgment of theGeneral Court. This ruling concerned the
stage preceding the submission by the Commission of
draft legislative proposal to the co-legislators. The NGO
ClientEarth had sent the Commission two requests for
access to specific documents, namely one for the draft
impact assessment report regarding access to justice in
environmental matters and one for the impact assess-
ment report regarding inspections and surveillance in
environmental matters, together with the respective
opinions of the Impact Assessment Board. Both requests
had been rejected by the Commission. In first instance,
the General Court dismissed the actions introduced
by ClientEarth for annulment of the decisions of the
Commission. ClientEarth, unsurprisingly supported in
this endeavor by Finland and Sweden, appealed the judg-
ment of the General Court before the Court of Justice.
To motivate its refusal, the Commission relied on
the first subparagraph of Article 4(3) of Regulation
No 1049/2001. It argued that “impact assessments were
intended to help it in preparing its legislative proposals
and that the content of those assessments were used
to support the policy choices made in such proposals.”
Therefore, the disclosure, at this “very early and delicate
stage,” “would seriously undermine its ongoing decision-
making processes” in restricting “its room for maneuver,
[reducing] its ability to reach a compromise” (ClientEarth
v. European Commission, §§15, 17).
To the greatest joy of ClientEarth, the Court of Justice
annulled the judgment of the General Court. The Court
acknowledged that as “the impact assessment proce-
dure takes place upstream of the legislative procedure
sensu stricto,” the Commission “does [indeed] not itself
act in a legislative capacity” at that stage. However,
“policy choices made [by the Commission] in its legisla-
tive proposals [are] supported by the content of those
assessments.” The latter contain “information constitut-
ing important elements of the EU legislative process,
forming part of the basis for the legislative action.”
As a result:
[T]he disclosure of those documents is likely to
increase the transparency and openness of the leg-
islative process as a whole…and, thus, to enhance
the democratic nature of the EU by enabling its cit-
izens to scrutinize that information and to attempt
to influence that process. (ClientEarth v. European
Commission, 2018, §92)
These considerations led the Court to qualify those
documents as legislative and, further in the judgment,
to reject—contrary to the General Court—the gen-
eral presumption of confidentiality of those documents
(ClientEarth v. European Commission, 2018, §§68–70,
85–86, 89–93, 102 et seq.).
If the ClientEarth case was crucial in determining by
which set of transparency standards the pre-initiative
stage of the legislative process is governed, it joins what
constitutes the vast majority of the CJEU’s case law in
the field of transparency: the case law defining the limits
of Article 4 (“Exceptions”) of Regulation No 1049/2001
(2001). As exceptions, the CJEUmust proceed to a restric-
tive interpretation. In this endeavor, the CJEU must
decide which institutions’ arguments for confidentiality
are acceptable and which are not. The CJEU sometimes
goes beyond this binary exercise by giving, through an
obiter dictum, an indication on how the institutions’ argu-
ments should be reframed in the future to be accept-
able de lege lata. This case law has progressively framed
the spectrum of what should or should not be trans-
parent, despite presenting sometimes some obscurities
and contradictions (Adamsky, 2009; Maiani, Villeneuve,
& Pasquier, 2010, p. 16).
For instance, on what documents can be deemed
‘sensitive,’ the General Court underlined in the
De Capitani case that the mere fact that the documents
at stake relate to a sensitive field of EU law “cannot
per se suffice in demonstrating the special sensitivity of
the documents” (De Capitani v. European Parliament,
2018, §89). To hold otherwise would exempt this whole
field of EU law from the transparency requirements.
The sensitivity point is even less relevant considering
that the documents in that case concerned “a draft
regulation, of general scope, binding in all of its ele-
ments and directly applicable in all the Member States,
which naturally concerns citizens” and affect their rights
(De Capitani v. European Parliament, 2018, §90). The
General Court specified that the reason of sensitivity
could only be successful if the information contained
in a document is “particularly sensitive to the point of
jeopardizing a fundamental interest of the EU or of the
Member States if disclosed” (De Capitani v. European
Parliament, 2018, §97). On the ‘risk of external pressure’
that would result from making documents publicly avail-
able, the General Court insisted in the same case that
“co-legislators must be held accountable for their actions
to the public” (De Capitani v. European Parliament, 2018,
§98). One could argue that it is inherent to decision-
making to be under external pressures of different kinds.
In the ClientEarth case, ClientEarth smartly reversed the
European Commission’s argument by arguing that “open-
ness enhances [the] independence [of the institutions
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involved], by placing [them] in a position to better
resist any external pressures” (ClientEarth v. European
Commission, 2018, §64). Yet the General Court acknowl-
edged that the risk of external pressure could constitute
a legitimate ground for restricting access to documents
if its reality is “established with certainty, and evidence
must be adduced to show that there is a reasonably fore-
seeable risk that the decision to be taken would be sub-
stantially affected” (De Capitani v. European Parliament,
2018, §99). We see here a concrete example of that del-
icate balance we referred to above: The General Court
keeps the door open to pay judicial respect to the text,
but the door is so narrowly ajar that it appears difficult
to go through.
3.2. A Delicate Position in View of the Principles of
Institutional Balance and of Institutional Autonomy
The limits to the right of access to documents expressly
recognized by EU primary and secondary law pre-
vent the CJEU from consecrating an absolute right
of access (ClientEarth v. European Commission, 2018,
§77; De Capitani v. European Parliament, 2018, §112),
even for legislative documents. In the De Capitani case,
the General Court acknowledged, as suggested by the
three institutions, that the “widest possible access”
as provided for in—inter alia—Article 1 of Regulation
No 1049/2001, cannot be regarded as equivalent to
“absolute access” (De Capitani v. European Parliament,
2018, §112). The same consideration by the Court of
Justice in the ClientEarth case indicated to the European
Commission that it can reject a request at the condition
to duly justify its decision by motivating why the dis-
closure would seriously undermine its ongoing decision-
making processes, quod non in that case (ClientEarth v.
European Commission, 2018, §§123–124).
This is partly explained by the limits of interpreta-
tion we elaborated on above, but also by a more fun-
damental consideration. As we can see in the case law
on Regulation No 1049/2001, the CJEU’s margin is thin:
Its ruling options are binary in essence, namely to con-
sider that the institution should have given access or
not, despite the debate on openness being more com-
plex. It is not only about giving access or not, but rather
when and how; in other words, about allowing or not
the scrutiny and participation of any interested citizen
while a legislative act is in the making. The CJEU rec-
ognizes this by highlighting transparency as a precondi-
tion for the exercise by EU citizens of their democratic
rights. However, the CJEU fails to give fullmeaning to that
exercise and to the substance of those rights, although
the elliptical provisions that are Articles 10 and 11 TEU
contain the ingredients for a more ambitious agenda.
Nevertheless, it cannot be blamed for this failure, as its
mandate and institutional position prevent it taking fur-
ther steps in this field.
The very limit that prevents the CJEU from doing so
can surely be found in the principle of separation of pow-
ers, or in its sort of substitute in the EU context, which is
the principle of institutional balance, and in the principle
of institutional autonomy. The judiciary should refrain
from ultra viresmarked interventions into theworking of
the sacrosanct legislative branch. Looking at the whole
debate of determining what is the principle and what
should be the exceptions through these lenses gives the
debate a particularly sensitive taste, especially when con-
sidering the stances taken by the institutions brought
before the CJEU by individuals or NGOs.
The De Capitani case was particularly telling in this
aspect. Mr Emilio De Capitani, a former civil servant of
the European Parliament, asked the latter to be granted
access to the so-called four-column documents of all
ongoing trilogue negotiations. The term trilogue refers to
informal tripartite meetings that gather representatives
of the Commission, the European Parliament, and the
Council, with the aim of finding compromises on—in the
present context—legislative files (Giersdorf, 2019). This
iswhere, behind closed doors, the political agreement on
a legislative file is sealed. Hence trilogues constitute the
“decisive phases of the legislative process” (European
Parliament, 2016, §§22, 26) or, in other words, “a sub-
stantial phase of the legislative procedure, and not a sep-
arate ‘space to think”’ (European Parliament, 2011, §29).
The four-column document is the central piece of
the negotiations. In this document, the first column con-
tains the proposal of the European Commission, the sec-
ond the position of the European Parliament on the
latter and its suggestions for amendments (if any), the
third the position of the Council, and the last a ten-
tative compromise or the preliminary positions of the
Presidency of the Council in relation to the amendments
proposed by the European Parliament. Often, the final
text as adopted is a copy-paste of the final version of
the fourth column. While this document does not report
on all exchanges happening during the negotiations, it
gives a clear insight into what position each institution
involved defends behind closed doors, and how this posi-
tion evolves during the negotiations. As Mr De Capitani’s
request targeted all ongoing procedures, the European
Parliament rejected it as processing it would create an
excessive administrative burden. Mr De Capitani there-
fore introduced a confirmatory application limiting the
scope of the request to ongoing procedures related to
specific areas. As a result, the European Parliament gave
full access to five of the seven four-column documents it
identified, but limited the access to the last two, refus-
ing to disclose the fourth column of those two docu-
ments. Mr De Capitani challenged this refusal before the
General Court.
The European Parliament invoked the first subpara-
graph of Article 4(3) of Regulation No 1049/2001 (2001),
arguing that the requested disclosure would:
[A]ctually, specifically and seriously undermine the
decision-making process of the institution as well
as the inter-institutional decision-making process in
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the context of the ongoing legislative procedure and
[that] no overriding public interest which outweighs
the public interest in the effectiveness of the legisla-
tive procedure had been identified in the present
case. (De Capitani v. European Parliament, 2018, §6)
It maintained “that the principle of transparency and the
higher requirements of democracy do not and cannot
constitute in themselves an overriding public interest”
(De Capitani v. European Parliament, 2018, §8). In sup-
port of its position, and in addition to the sensitivity and
risk of external pressure points mentioned earlier, the
European Parliament put forward two other arguments.
First, the disclosure:
[W]ould make the Presidency of the Council [warier]
of sharing information and cooperating with the
Parliament negotiating team and, in particular, the
rapporteur; moreover, the Parliament negotiating
team would be forced, on account of the increased
pressure from national authorities and interest
groups, to make premature strategic choices…which
would ‘complicate dramatically the finding of an
agreement on a common position’. (De Capitani v.
European Parliament, 2018, §7)
Second, since the principle according to which ‘noth-
ing is agreed until everything is agreed’ is “very impor-
tant for the proper functioning of the legislative pro-
cedure,” the disclosure “before the end of the nego-
tiations of one element, even if it is itself not sen-
sitive, may have negative consequences on all other
parts of a dossier” and “disclosure of positions that
have not yet become final risks giving an inaccurate
idea of what the positions of the institutions actually
are” and therefore “significantly compromise the credi-
bility of the legislative process and of the co-legislators
themselves.” The European Parliament concluded that
“access to the whole of the fourth column should be
refused until the text agreed has been approved by the
co-legislators.” By making these points, the European
Parliament calls in short for a time-limited confidential-
ity of the fourth column, “for a very brief period of time”
(De Capitani v. European Parliament, 2018, §§7, 43–45,
47, 50). As the European Parliament had given access
to five out of the seven identified fourth columns, the
European Parliament appeared to show a quite posi-
tive attitude towards the publication of the four-column
document in principle. Hence the European Parliament
insisted, perhaps strategically, on the exceptional nature
of its refusal.
The arguments put forward by the European
Parliament demonstrated how sensitive the case was
and how deep in the intricacies of the legislative proce-
dure, “the closed technocratic machinery of the institu-
tions” (Lea & Cardwell, 2015, p. 79), the General Court
was invited to intervene. Despite its delicate position for
the reasons exposed above, the General Court under-
stood that allowing such arguments to be successful
would inevitably open Pandora’s Box. Indeed, those argu-
ments did affect the very essence of the legislative pro-
cess. The four-column documents “form part of the leg-
islative process” (De Capitani v. European Parliament,
2018, §§38, 75, 78, 80, 98). As recalled above, it follows
that they should, in principle, be made public, as:
[I]t is precisely openness in the legislative process
that contributes to conferring greater legitimacy on
the institutions in the eyes of EU citizens and increas-
ing their confidence in them by allowing divergences
between various points of view to be openly debated.
(De Capitani v. European Parliament, 2018, §78)
A time-limited non-disclosure of the fourth column as
requested by the European Parliament would in essence
prevent citizens from exercising their rights at a very cru-
cial point in time. As theGeneral Court importantly notes,
transparency requirements cannot be undermined by
objectives of protecting the effectiveness and integrity
of the legislative process (De Capitani v. European
Parliament, 2018, §§81, 83). The efficiency of the process
is therefore not a successful argument to refuse access
to documents.
Yet the judgment of the General Court gives amiddle-
ground solution in the sense that one could argue that
debates should be livestreamed to give full publicity to
the exchanges. Indeed, the General Court fell short of
saying that trilogue meetings should take place in public.
On the contrary, it accepts with deference the necessity
to keep the “possibility of a free [in the sense of con-
fidential] exchange of views” (ClientEarth v. European
Commission, 2018, §106) between the co-legislators,
although the Treaties explicitly foresee the publicity of
activities of the co-legislators when considering legisla-
tive files. Therefore, the General Court preserved a cer-
tain margin of maneuver for institutions to reorganize
their relations in the framework of legislative procedures.
Again, we see here the expression of that delicate bal-
ance that the CJEU must strike. It can explain why the
European Parliament decided not to appeal the judg-
ment of the General Court, not to risk obtaining a more
unfavorable position from the Court of Justice. Such a
balanced position of the CJEU is also exemplified by the
position of the Court of Justice when, in its ClientEarth
ruling, it gives a moderate interpretation of Article 11(2)
TEU (2016) by saying that “that provision in no way
means that the Commission is required to respond, on
the merits and in each individual case, to the remarks it
may have received following disclosure of a document”
(ClientEarth v. European Commission, 2018, §106).
3.3. Time Is of the Essence
Another limitation to the CJEU’s substantive contribu-
tion to improving transparency of the legislative process
has to do with a simple yet consequential concept: time.
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As both theGeneral Court in theDe Capitani case and the
Court of Justice in the ClientEarth case ruled, the appro-
priate exercise by EU citizens of their democratic right to
participate in the legislative process requires that they
gain access to the information in a timely manner, at a
critical stage of the procedure, namely while the debate
is still ongoing, and a decision has not yet been taken.
Since the key political debates surrounding legisla-
tive proposals are taking place in trilogue meetings, this
is therefore essential to give access in extenso et omni
tempore at least to the only written source giving a
dynamic account of the discussions. The access to this
information is required by, on one hand, the model
of representative democracy, in which citizens should
be able to hold their elected representatives account-
able for the positions they take and, on the other hand,
to allow the same citizens, in one way or another, to
take part directly in an ongoing procedure (De Capitani
v. European Parliament, 2018, §§36, 41). However, in
the position it defended in the De Capitani case, the
European Parliament called, in short, for a time-limited
confidentiality of the fourth column, “for a very brief
period of time” (De Capitani v. European Parliament,
2018, §§7, 43–45, 47, 50). But, as already underlined, a
time-limited non-disclosure of the fourth column would
in essence prevent citizens from exercising their rights
at the very crucial point in time. On the provisional
nature of the information contained in those documents,
the General Court insisted on the fact that the public
“is perfectly capable of understanding that the author of
a proposal is likely to amend its content subsequently”
(De Capitani v. European Parliament, 2018, §102). In the
ClientEarth case, the Court of Justice emphasized that:
[T]he possibility for citizens to scrutinize and bemade
aware of all the information forming the basis for EU
legislative action…presupposes not only that those
citizens have access to the information at issue…but
also that they may have access to that information
in good time, at a point that enables them effec-
tively to make their views known regarding those
choices [before any decision is taken]. (ClientEarth
v. European Commission, 2018, §84, read in conjunc-
tion with §§46–47; emphasis by the author)
To this end, the Court considered—again contrary to the
General Court—that:
Not only acts adopted by the EU legislature, but also,
more generally, documents drawn up or received in
the course of procedures for the adoption of acts
which are legally binding in or for the Member
States, fall to be described as ‘legislative documents’
and, consequently, subject to Articles 4 and 9 of
that Regulation, must be made directly accessible.
(ClientEarth v. European Commission, 2018, §85, read
in conjunction with §§68–70)
Nevertheless, the length of the procedures before the
CJEU renders the latter unable to satisfy the expectations
of individuals appearing before it in that participatory
aspect. Judges and legislators have “fundamentally dif-
ferent time horizons” (Alter, 1998, p. 122). In both the
De Capitani and the ClientEarth cases, all documents—
some in their final instead of intermediary version—at
issue had been made available to the public, and deci-
sions taken in the respective (pre)legislative procedures,
by the time the courts gave their judgments. In addition,
on a procedural note, the necessary interest in bringing
proceedings that must be demonstrated by the individ-
ual is still subject to debate in the present field, especially
in the case of an appeal (see, for instance, the recent
judgment in the case Päivi Leino-Sandberg v. European
Parliament [2021]).
In other words, today’s claimants are fighting for
tomorrow transparency’s activists. This is only true if,
and only if, judgments are followed by effective changes
of the transparency policies of the institutions con-
cerned. On this note, obtaining a judgment of the CJEU
still poses the question of its enforcement; should a
judgment of any of the two courts of the CJEU not be
respected by an institution, the only remedy available
to an individual would be an action for damages under
Article 340 TFEU (2016).
4. A Risk of Perverse Effect
Furthermore, the CJEU’s action in this field does not
only suffer from these three limitations, but also entails
the risk of having a perverse effect. Indeed, the mis-
sion to interpret the transparency requirements entails
a risk for transparency activists, as it is fixing the borders
between what should be transparent and what should
not. In the cases above-mentioned this was particularly
salient when the CJEU qualified what qualified as sen-
sitive information and what did not. Stéphanie Novak’s
(2014) work on the transparency of the Council high-
lighted such a potential perverse effect by emphasiz-
ing the wide margin of discretion that institutions enjoy
in the implementation of transparency rules. Moreover,
when it comes to dealingwith informalmechanisms such
as trilogues, pushing for more transparency inevitably
pushes the informality a little further. A judgment like
the De Capitani ruling can have the negative conse-
quence of showing to the institutions concerned how
they should organize elements or discussions they want
to stay confidential. Despite a formal procedure being
laid down in Article 294 TFEU (2016), the ordinary leg-
islative procedure has become increasingly informal in
the last two decades (Reh, Héritier, Bressanelli, & Koop,
2011). The De Capitani case epitomizes the difficulty of
grasping the substance of informal exchanges for the
sake of transparency. It equals the endeavor of trying to
make transparent what is inherently—to some extent—
passing below the radar. That the General Court says
that the fact that a document has “been produced or
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received in a formal or informal context has no effect
on the interpretation” of the rules on access to docu-
ments (De Capitani v. European Parliament, 2018, §101)
has little effect on the inherent difficulties linked to
that phenomenon.
5. Conclusions
Is the CJEU able to contribute to improving the openness
of the EU legislative process? If the CJEU indeed has the
capacity to do so, its capacity is limited, and its actions
can lead to paradoxically reducing the transparency of
the legislative process. This article aimed to shed light on
the limits to the role that the CJEU can play in the trans-
parency of the legislative process debate.
The four considerations highlighted in this
contribution—the limits of interpretation, the princi-
ples of institutional balance and institutional autonomy,
time, and the risk of perverse consequences that the
interpretation exercise entails—impede a broader and
more ambitious action of the CJEU in the field of trans-
parency of the legislative process. These issues cannot
all be addressed. The fourth issue—the risk of perverse
consequences—is inherent to the interpretation exer-
cise. However, the EU legislator could reduce the effects
of the three limitations in the context of a revision of
Regulation No 1049/2001. It could define a new equi-
librium in the dynamics in place between the CJEU and
other institutions by providing the public but also the
CJEUwith provisions increasing the transparency require-
ments of legislative documents, and delineating the
scope of the legislative action, drawing from the case law.
However, such a reform, awaited formore than a decade,
remains politically sensitive (Curtin & Leino-Sandberg,
2016, p. 5; Driessen, 2012, pp. 269–270). Interestingly,
Hillebrandt, Curtin, and Meijer (2014, p. 15) note that
“progressive clarification of Regulation No 1049/2001 by
the courts has rendered it more difficult for a Council
majority to accept this regulation as a starting point.”
The EU institutional law aficionados can still nourish the
secret hope that the upcoming Conference on the Future
of Europe could constitute a momentum. In any case, a
revision of the Treaties is not necessary, as long as the
CJEU fully grasps the potential of some of its provisions
such as Articles 10 and 11 TEU (2016). Nevertheless, the
substantial improvement that a revision of Regulation
No 1049/2001 could bring would be to insert a new
type of urgent procedure allowing the CJEU to act swiftly
when a request is rejected. This would lead to a new
institutional balance in the matter, and as such would
need to carefully avoid slowing down the legislative
procedure, otherwise risking again to damage the prin-
ciples of institutional balance and institutional auton-
omy. The obvious question is: Why would the European
Parliament and the Council proceed to a revision in that
direction as they would be considerably impacted in
their legislative work? One could argue that the poten-
tial enormous number of requests that could ensue from
such a revision, as feared by these institutions, might be
overestimated by the latter. On a more positive note,
the co-legislators could grasp the political interest of
enjoying a greater legitimacy thanks to a stronger trans-
parency apparatus. Yet the insertion of such an urgent
procedure might involve amending the Treaties or, at
least, the Statute of the CJEU.
Whatever reform could take place, transparency
activists should refrain fromputting all their hopes in judi-
cial interventions, as only self-regulating exercises by the
three institutions concerned seem to lead to concrete
and tangible results. As the current President of the CJEU
put it, writing about the principle of democracy:
[I]t is by progressively narrowing the gap between
our conception of an ideal form of government and
the government which actually rules over us that
the former becomes less utopian, as society grows
more receptive to the practical reforms implied by
those ideals and more of them come to be real-
ized. Ironically, we may never close that gap…since
new utopian thoughts have always been the dynamic
force through which mankind has moved forward.
(Lenaerts, 2013, pp. 314–315)
This might hold true for transparency too.
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